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Abstract—For a long time, the Internet and web technolo-
gies have supported a more fluid interaction between pub-
lic institutions and citizens through e-government. With this
spirit, several public services are being offered online. One
of such services, though not a standard one, is transparency.
Strongly encouraged by open-data initiatives, transparency is
being marketed as a powerful mechanism to fight corruption.
Leveraging communication technologies, societies are broadly
adopting online transparency practices to give the general public
more control over the scrutiny of state institutions. However,
a neglected implementation of transparency may cause almost
unlimited access to large amounts of information, a side effect
we call hyper-transparency. Inevitably, serious privacy risks arise
for the individuals in this context. In this work, we analyze
the emergence of hyper-transparent practices in Ecuador, a
country recently involved in a fierce attempt to offer free
access to public information as a fundamental right enabled
through e-government. Moreover, we systematically dissect the
large amount of microdata released online by Ecuadorian public
institutions. Accordingly, we also unveil here a scenario where
sensitive information of public employees is openly released under
transparency laws. After exposing potential privacy violations, we
elaborate on some mechanisms aimed at protecting citizens from
such violations.
Index Terms—privacy, transparency, e-government, personal
information, disclosure
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last years, there has been a growing concern
about the indiscriminate collection of personal information
performed by governments and other entities that are natural
hubs of such data. Their opaque operation, commonly without
permission, creates said concern. However, in the name of
transparency, an even more evident threat to the privacy of
citizens is posed by public entities enabling e-government.
It is well known that public institutions concentrate a lot
of personal information generated from their interactions with
most of the citizens. Such information may go from tax pay-
ment records to basic service consumption patterns. Moreover,
the state holds additional data (e.g., salaries) of a particular
group of individuals: public employees, which are a significant
part of the population of a country. E-government initiatives
encourage a digitized management of all this information, not
only to get more out of it, but also to facilitate the inclusion of
citizens in the public sphere. Though much of this information
can be catalogued as sensitive, being hold by the state, it
is a consensus to consider it safe by default. Nevertheless,
e-government brings about paradigms such as transparency
(yesteryear harder to be massively implemented) that spawn
new privacy risks.
E-government entails processing information in online plat-
forms, and transparency builds on the explicit disclosure of
data (to give citizens open access to the public affairs). Then,
the inherent requirement of these mechanisms to release data
(though often partially) generates privacy risks that must be
addressed. Such risks arise from the fact that this (potentially
personal) information, when publicly released, could be aggre-
gated and processed to freely identify, classify or even track
individuals online.
To illustrate the severity of these privacy issues, we analyze
them in Ecuador, a small country where the efforts of the
state to implement e-government and transparency started just
a few years ago. In an attempt to build a more accountable,
participative and less corrupt democracy [7], they probably
got too transparent public information systems. Sadly, whereas
rankings are published to catalogue transparent societies [1],
the lack of standard metrics [8] implies that the perception of
transparency could be arbitrarily manipulated [9]. Moreover,
transparency is tightly related to multiple factors, so finding
a tradeoff with privacy is very complex [10], especially when
the benefits of transparency enabled by e-government may be
overrated [11].
The efforts towards e-government and transparency in
Ecuador, and surely in other countries, have been so abrupt
that have brought to light many privacy breaches that, although
evident, have been extensively neglected by the society. On the
contrary, several information management practices, enabled
by law, have been quickly accepted as normal and useful by
citizens. We try to shed some light on the implications for
individual privacy of these paradigms and we depict various
protection strategies.
TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION OF INFORMATION RELEASED BY PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE ECUADORIAN TRANSPARENCY LAW; IN THIS CASE, A PAYROLL.
National identity
number Full name
Budget item
number Position Salary
Additional
income
Annual
income
1712345678 Juan Manuel Flores Jaramillo 565 Assitant 1000 100 14,200
0200405436 Mara Luisa Castro Carrillo 243 Account advisor 2000 150 25,800
3467135623 Carlos Luis Torres Mera 100 Minister 5000 500 66,000
II. TOWARDS DIGITAL HYPER-TRANSPARENCY IN
ECUADOR
In general, transparency is related to accountability [7].
To that end, i.e., to be transparent, an entity has to provide
information. The more information is provided, the easier
is for others to “see” what actions are performed or how
decisions are made. Accordingly, being transparent requires
disclosing a great wealth of information. In fact, laws enforc-
ing transparency build on a constitutional right of access to
public information [6].
It is not different in Ecuador. A law enacted in 2004 seeks
for transparency and free access to public information as
fundamental rights of Ecuadorians [19]. The jurisdiction of this
law covers all the institutions funded by public resources, or
“public institutions”, and that are required to periodically ad-
vertise in the Web what is known as “public information”. As
expected, the cited law describes public information broadly
as “all the information that emerges or that is held by public
institutions.” Also, for publication purposes, the law specifies
the minimum items that must be released online. Some excep-
tions include confidential information, i.e., information derived
from personal and fundamental rights of people.
The Ecuadorian transparency law specifies that at least 15
items of information be released by every public institution
through their websites, including, e.g.: the organic structure
and legal base, the directory, the salaries of employees, the
services offered, and the contractual processes. As a result
of this provision, all public institutions periodically release
hundreds of files containing information not only about their
operation itself, but also about their employees.
We believe that it is not necessary to release so much
information, but the law is by no means specific with regard
to the granularity of the data to be published. Particularly,
we refer to very granular information about unitary entities,
such as employees, that certainly hold their own interests and
rights. With regard to employees of public institutions, we are
struck by the extremely detailed data revealed when enforcing
the literal c of article 7 of the Ecuadorian transparency law.
As illustrated in Table I, public institutions disclose a dataset
containing national identification numbers, full names, budget
item numbers, positions, salaries, additional icomes, and the
total annual incomes of their employees. We have at least a
slight doubt that releasing so much information is useful or
even practical for the purposes of transparency.
As suggested in Sec. I, another source of transparency has
emerged in the public sector over the last years: e-government.
Motivated by a culture of digitalisation of paperwork, some
public institutions in Ecuador have begun to offer part of their
services online. Putting aside the tax declaration and payment
services offered by the SRI (Internal Revenue Service), we talk
about simple services that offer electronic certificates, appoint-
ment scheduling, online payment, but especially, information.
Let us illustrate by example some of the benefits brought by
e-government in the Ecuadorian context. These e-government
services turn to be very useful for Juan, an Ecuadorian living
in Quito. To meet the annual mechanical review of his car, he
gets an appointment through the website of the transit agency
(ANT). Even his birth registry can be issued electronically
for a cost lower than taking a taxi to the Civil Registry.
Moreover, to pay his home phone service bill, Juan monthly
checks the invoice on the website of the telephone company
and then uses the electronic channels of his bank to transfer
the corresponding value. In addition, having commited a traffic
violation, Juan finds out the value of his fine and, again,
pays it through Internet. Seeking to apply for a job, he
finds it very practical to obtain a record of his academic
degrees, a certificate of having a job in the public sector (also
the institution), and a certificate endorsing his entirely clean
criminal record; all of this making a few clicks. As a model
citizen, Juan can declare and pay his taxes using his private
web account on the SRI website. To top it off, through a
module of this interface for payment of taxes, Juan can check,
as a hobby, whether or not some of the politicians he supports
are also paying their taxes. We depict this hyper-transparent
platform in Fig. 1, including some of the public services
offered along with the personal attributes that are available
to Juan.
The ideal scenario set out in the previous paragraph has a
dark flipside. From all the items of information retrieved by
Juan in our example, only a few, such as electronic invoices,
are offered through a private interface; the rest is publicly
available on the Web. Namely, privacy attackers can also
retrieve his information, as seen in Fig. 1. Also supporting
hyper-transparency, a very striking effect is observed from the
availability of the information described: for each service, not
only the intended information is released about Juan, but also
additional attributes. The same occurs for the rest of citizens.
Then, not only the amount to be paid for Juan’s traffic fines
is published on the Web; other details are also released such
as the date and place of the offense, a precise description
of the infraction, and even a photograph of his car and its
plate at the exact moment of the infraction. Juan’s transparent
condition is also evidenced because his phone service bill
can be obtained publicly from the telephone company if
one knows Juan’s phone number or his last names. As with
his traffic fines, some other attributes are leaked: Juan’s full
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Fig. 1. Hyper-transparent platform publicly disclosing multiple personal
attributes in Ecuador.
name, address, debts, telephone consumption time, additional
services (Internet, TV), and benefits for elders. As if that were
not transparent enough, the telephone company has an open
phone book system which, using Juan’s last name as search
criteria, might reveal all the phone lines he has contracted,
their numbers, and the corresponding addresses. Juan realizes
that other systems complement his transparent profile with
public information about his education (where he studied and
when), job, and criminal record. For Juan, this gets closer to
the dystopia described in [17] when he grasps that the online
system of a ministry, called Social Registry, openly allows
anyone to obtain some of the demographic data of a census
made in 2014, including: his full name, age, gender, marital
status, data of his sentimental partner, and the existence or
not of a disability condition. In addition to his salary, Juan’s
income and housing taxes are also published online. Besides,
these systems disclose the address, property valuation, and
construction area (for housing taxes).
Table II includes at least 17 unique personal attributes
that can be learned about Juan from the ecosystem we have
described above. Among the institutions releasing this data are:
universities, ministries, or specific public institutions. Most of
these attributes are disclosed through specific services offered
by public institutions to ease the interaction with citizens.
Certainly, a very detailed profile can be constructed about Juan
and many other individuals in the name of transparency and
e-governance. Thus, the consequence is an hyper-transparent
ecosystem that still many people may not appreciate, but
maybe it should, because Ecuadorians do care about their
privacy [5].
III. JEOPARDIZING PRIVACY IN THE NAME OF
TRANSPARENCY: THE CASE OF ECUADOR
In this section, we analyze the impact of an hyper-
transparent ecosystem on the privacy of individuals. We por-
tray the personal attributes openly revealed due to transparency
policies and by e-government implementations. Then, we
unveil the derived privacy risks in the context of Ecuador.
A. Personal Data: The Raw Material for Compromising Pri-
vacy
Personal data means information that relates to an individ-
ual. They are structured by attributes, each of which represents
a feature or characteristic of a person. A dataset where
subjects are individually described using a set of attributes
is refered to as microdata. Although the values of some
attributes (e.g., marital status, sex, address) can be shared
among various individuals, the attributes called identifiers are
pieces of information that relates to a unique individual, thus
identifying her. An identifier may be a social security number,
a national identification number, a driver’s license number, and
also a full name. Evidently, any other attribute published along
with an identifier (e.g., the salary with the national identity
number) can be inequivocally associated to the individual
to whom the data belongs. Thus, to protect the privacy of
data subjects, identifiers are generally removed from the data
before it is released or shared. All other attributes hardly say
something specific about an individual when seen individu-
ally. However, the combination of very few of them could
be so unique that may inequivocally identify an individual
within the population of a country [2]. For this reason, these
attributes are usually called quasi-identifiers and mostly refer
to demographic attributes such as age, sex, address, birth
date or marital status. Among quasi-identifiers, we can also
find other attributes called confidential attributes that carry
sensitive information of an individual, e.g., salary, religion or
health condition. Naturally, if confidential attributes become
matched to an identified individual, it may cause her significant
damage to her reputation, thus representing a serious risk for
her privacy.
Many other attributes can significantly enrich a user’s profile
as seen by a privacy attacker, particularly those derived from
non-conventional data currently generated through the Web.
We refer, e.g., to the fingerprint left by a web browser when
the user surfs the Web (which could be very unique) [4],
the interests and behavior of users, and their movement
patterns [12]; all of these attributes can be learned from online
user interactions.
As motivated in Section II, plenty of these attributes are
deliberately disclosed by public institutions in Ecuador in
the name of both transparency and e-government initiatives.
Ironically, most of this information is a by-product of the infor-
mation originally intended to be revealed, i.e., most of this per-
sonal data would be unnecessarily disclosed. This information
is plagued with identifying attributes. Furthermore, a variety
of less specific demographic attributes (quasi-identifiers) are
also disclosed, including: age, sex, address, education level,
marital status, and even data related to the sentimental partner
of individuals. Attributes concerning sensitive information are
also carelessly and openly disclosed; we found here economic
and judicial data. Some of these attributes are: salary, revenue,
shares in companies, properties in general, criminal history,
TABLE II
POTENCIAL PRIVACY ATTACKS AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES ACCORDING TO THE PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES DISCLOSED BY PUBLIC ONLINE SERVICES
Public
online services Objective
Intended
information
offered (examples)
Personal information
released
Potential
privacy attack
Protection
approach
Tax
Payment
To serve as a transparency
tool that can reveal the
subjects that may be
evading paying taxes
Income tax
Housing tax
Foreign exchange tax
National identity number Identification Suppression
Revenue Classification Generalization
Personal expenses Classification Generalization
Property characteristics Classification Suppression
Transparency
To give citizens
access to information
of public institutions (law)
Employee payrolls
Contracting processes
National identity number Identification Suppression
Full name Identification Suppression
Salary Classification Generalization
Debt consultation
To give citizens easy
access to information
about their debts at
different public instances
Payment of basic services
Payment of traffic fines
National identity number Identification Suppression
Address Surveillance Suppression
Amount of properties Classification Suppression
Age Classification Suppression
Movement patterns Surveillance Suppression
Verification
To enable verification of
data about people and
companies (useful in
certain procedures,
e.g., hiring or rental of
housing)
Criminal record check
Education degrees obtained
National identity number Identification Suppression
Criminal history Classification Access control
Education level Classification Access control
Shares in companies Classification Accesscontrol
Work place Surveillance Access control
Marital status Classification Access control
Disability condition Classification Access control
Age Classification Suppression
legal proceedings, and even the existence or not of a disability
condition.
The Ecuadorian entities holding all this information are mul-
tiple. Firstly, all universities have large repositories of degree
written works containing full names of the students who grad-
uated there (a large set of individuals). Also, entities offering
highly demanded services, e.g., the SRI, commonly allow a
match among full names and national identity numbers when
querying their online systems. This match enables getting the
national identity number of a any citizen whose full name is
known, and viceversa. This is as well possible through the
payrolls published under the mandate of the transparency law,
but the population covered reaches “only” public employees.
Furthermore, this individual’s identity number is generally the
argument required to query the rest of public online services.
Our analysis just shows that this hyper-transparent ecosys-
tem in Ecuador is full of personal data openly available to an
undefined but huge amount of potential privacy attackers. In
addition, access to this ecosystem is so open that third party
services [13] are freely aggregating the personal information
obtained from public online systems, by concentrating all
the queries done to such services through a mashup central
interface. These third-party services are already making money
by offering a consolidated summary of public personal infor-
mation about individuals.
B. Privacy Risks Derived from Transparency in Ecuador
Given the magnitude of the distortions, it is straightforward
to expose the privacy risks brought about by the personal
data available on public online services due to the application
of the transparency law or an incorrect implementation of
the e-government paradigm in Ecuador. In this Section, we
characterize some of these risks by explaining the privacy
attacks that may derive from the disclosure of the attributes
described in Section III-A.
Identification attacks enable an attacker to inequivocally sin-
gle out an individual among others within a given population,
e.g., through an identifier that enables an attacker to distinguish
a subject (the victim) from others. Once an identifier of the
victim is known, it is relatively easy for an attacker to couple
more attributes (e.g., sensitive ones) to the identity of the
victim. In fact, personal information is always indexed or
associated with identifiers and that way it is usually disclosed.
Thus, the identification of an individual increases her privacy
risk in the same way that identifying a criminal facilitates
tracking him down.
In Ecuador, the risk of identification is high because online
documents and interfaces providing public information are also
revealing powerful identifiers. In this context, several ways
exist to obtain the identifiers of a victim. For instance, with
the name of the victim in question, one just has to look at
the payroll of the institution where she works to find out her
national identity number matched to her name. If the victim is
not a public employee, the same matching (national identity
number - full name) is still possible through most of the online
services offered by public institutions for verification because
these services, such as residential telephone bills, are publicly
available. These services allow per-individual basis queries
that, after receiving an individual’s full name (or part of it)
as argument, they return the expected information, e.g., her
income tax paid, but also additional information, such as her
national identification number.
This information leaking practice not only implies divul-
guing identifiers, but also addresses, movement patterns, eco-
nomic data, etc. As mentioned, the transparency policies derive
in the publication of identifiers, full names, and salaries of
citizens. Furthermore, tax payment verification services [14],
[15], intended to serve as a transparency tool to expose tax
evasion, also disclose individuals’ identifers, revenue, personal
expenses, and even property characteristics of people who
are not tax evaders. Finallly, services are offered that enable
verification of people’s data revealing plenty of personal
information, such as criminal history, education level, shares
in companies, work place, marital status, disability condition
and even age. To sum up, these online public services are
public verification 
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query: attribute_1
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attribute_2
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potential 
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Fig. 2. Illustration of personal information leaking practice in Ecuadorian
e-government platforms.
providing too much information, in fact, more than requested,
significantly increasing the privacy risk of these data subjects.
This practice is illustrated in Fig. 2.
With so much personal data at his disposal, a privacy at-
tacker has several options to vulnerate the intimacy of a victim
after identifying her. Another of such options is classification
attacks, which seek to group individuals according to a given
parameter, e.g., their purchasing power. For instance, with the
economic data publicly provided by the SRI, it is perfectly
possible for an entitity (such as a credit provider) to catalogue
people in terms of the amount of taxes they pay. Then, this
entity could refuse credit to people paying low taxes, because
they would have a low income. On a more critical scenario,
criminals could use this information to turn classification tasks
into an outlier detection strategy that reveals prime targets [16]
subject of robbery or even murder.
Ambiguous transparency policies and unrestricted access
to online systems holding personal information configure
a potential surveillance platform. Surveillance refers to an
ongoing observation of our “movements” which is perfectly
possible in an hyper-transparent ecosystem where personal
information (including movement patterns, address and work
place) are accessible to an undefined amount of privacy attack-
ers. This surveillance could easily become massive because
the information disclosed belongs to all Ecuadorian citizens
and particularly to public employees of institutions such as
the police, the army, the navy, public schools, and even the
public health system. Namely, there are millions of citizens
and thousands of public employees whose privacy may be
compromised.
In Table II we try to systematize the analysis done in
Sections II and III by matching the online services offered by
Ecuadorian public institutions with the personal information
they disclose, the potential privacy attacks built on this infor-
mation, and the protection approaches we describe in the next
Section. From this table, it is clear that most of these services
make it possible the match between name and national identity
number, which essentially derives in leaking identifers. Also,
we see that much of the personal information released makes
individuals prone to classification attacks, which might lead
to discrimination, retaliation, and blackmail [16].
Ironically, besides risking privacy when implemented
poorly, transparency does not seem to be a panacea. Informa-
tiont tends to flow only from citizens (lying there the massive
risk of privacy) and, when it comes to the great powers,
its application is even seriously punished. Thus, transparency
does not always lead to more accountability [18] or less
corruption. As it happens with Mexico, one of the most
transparent countries could still be considered among the most
corrupt [18], [21].
IV. PRIVACY PROTECTION STRATEGIES
The vagueness of transparency-related laws and the careless
implementation of e-government platforms are prompting seri-
ous privacy risks for a large part of the Ecuadorian population.
These are operational flaws in the handling of personal infor-
mation, so they can be tackled by regulating the flow of this
information to the Web. Thus, we next address some strategies
aimed at protecting privacy by reducing the amount of personal
information publicly released. The technical approaches in this
direction build on disclosure control techniques to regulate
the amount of information released online, i.e., mainly, gen-
eralization and suppression of data. Notwithstanding, a legal
framework is also required to standardize privacy protection
practices when personal information is handled. The strategies
we propose below are aligned with these practical and legal
focuses.
Evidently, we first propose tackling hyper-transparency by
minimizing the information published online. Data suppres-
sion is the first way to do it, thus, a mandatory first step should
be removing identifiers such as national identity numbers and
full names at least from payrolls of public institutions released
under the transparency law. This might be applicable immedi-
ately because the law edicts publishing the salary per position
and not per employee (a form of data generalization), as in
Uruguayan law [20]. The same strategy could be applied with
other documents containing personal identifiers. In this regard,
we also suggest modifying the operation of e-government
platforms so that useless services are disabled, as well the
match between full names and national identity numbers.
Removing identifiers is not always enough to protect pri-
vacy, since a few quasi-identifiers combined can have a
powerful identifying capability. Thus, if an attacker knows
that his victim’s data is contained in a dataset (e.g., a payroll),
he could take advantage of this property of quasi-identifiers
and individuate his victim, even if her identifiers have been
previously suppressed. To overcome this risk, generalization
can be applied to quasi-identifiers to obfuscate identifying
combinations of attributes. Generalization implies replacing
attribute values with a more general value, e.g., using a range
of years (1980-1990) instead of a specific year (1985) when
referring to the date of birth of an individual; or publishing a
category of salary (high, medium, or low) instead of revealing
its exact value.
While the availability of some sensitive information online
may be useful (e.g., invoices or pending debts), such utility
has sense only for the data owner. Thus, privacy could be
preserved by restricting the access to this private information
only to data owners, by means of an authentication module.
On the other hand, there is potentially sensitive data that must
stay publicly accessible for verification purposes (e.g., criminal
history or education records) and its access should not be
restricted. Then, in order to discourage malicious requests of
information and to balance the transparency model among
requesters and data subjects, the online platform could also
ask for information to those making requests in the first
place. Namely, e.g., a platform could ask the requester for
his identifier, full name, and motivations, before releasing the
criminal history of an individual. The data subject could even
receive a notice alerting him that he is being investigated
and by whom. In Table II, we include some of the strategies
that could be applied to protect privacy when each of the
mentioned personal attributes are disclosed. Since much of
this data is unnecessarily disclosed, in most cases suppression
is the more reasonable approach. For sensitive information that
needs to be released for transparency purposes (such as salary),
we propose generalization. Finally, for information released
for verification purposes (e.g., criminal history or education
record), we propose access control built on the provision of
information by the requester.
Depending on the privacy needs of particular individuals,
some services should allow them to opt out from being part
of a public data set. Actually, this should be a right of data
subjects. This is already possible for the phone book service
offered by CNT, but very few people know about it.
Although these strategies are guided by common sense and
some margin is given for its application, by the transparency
law, none of them are applied by default. Thus, a legal frame-
work to protect privacy could help accelerate their adoption,
particularly in a context where hyper-transparency is becoming
the norm. Such a legal framework would guarantee and make
visible the basic right of individuals to privacy over the still
legitimate right to access public information.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Transparency and e-government are means to facilitate the
interaction among citizens and public institutions that require
the disclosure of much information. However, a careless
management of personal information may lead to hyper-
transparency. It involves an unreasonable disclosure of per-
sonal data, which may result in dangerous distortions as shown
in the Ecuadorian society. In this ecosystem, at least 17
personal attributes can be learned online about an individ-
ual, leading to serious privacy risks. Using this information,
both identification and classification attacks can be performed
against user privacy, e.g., to match identifers with sensitive
attributes. Consequently, several of the online services offered
by Ecuadorian public institutions are disclosing personal in-
formation in multiple contexts. This yields potential privacy
risks that we have presented in this work along with the sug-
gested protection approaches. The main strategies to prevent
these privacy risks, before transparency policies are applied,
entail well-known approaches such as data suppression and
generalization.
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